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This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) where the 
regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only 
reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the 
regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two-part 
tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a less efficient fixed fee 
where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost. 
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Cet article étudie un problème standard de régulation (Laffont et Tirole, 1993) où le 
régulateur fait face à une contrainte de liquidité.  L'introduction d'une telle contrainte réduit 
non seulement le montant de bien public produit mais également les instruments disponibles 
pour le régulateur.  La contrainte financière peut modifier le contrat de régulation optimal 
d'un tarif en deux parties, où les quantités produites par la firme dépendent de son coût, à un 
payement forfaitaire, moins efficace, et où la firme produit la même quantité indépendamment 
de son coût.   
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A simple procurement problem1 consists in the following: a public authority (regulator) faces 
a monopolistic producer.  The firm provides an essential facility (bridge, road, infrastructure 
or sewer system) to a bunch of consumers and the authority regulates the term under which 
the producer delivers the service to them.  A procurement contract specifies an amount of 
public good the firm should produce and an associated financing scheme.   
 
When the regulator knows the technology of the firm, the optimal procurement contract 
requires that the firm produces the quantity of public good that maximizes the total surplus i.e. 
the consumer's surplus net of the firm's production cost and the authority fully reimburses the 
firm's cost.  
 
This contract could not be implemented when the firm's cost is private information.  In this 
setting, the procurement contract should provide the firm with incentives to reveal its true cost 
to the regulator.  The optimal procurement contract then requires that (1) the low cost firm 
still produces the quantity that maximizes the total surplus but it receives a compensation 
larger than its cost and (2) the high cost firm produces less than under symmetric information 
but its cost is still fully reimbursed.  Distortion in the quantity produced by the high cost firm 
aims to lower the compensation of the low cost firm (rent extraction efficiency trade-off).  
This second best contract could be implemented with a non-linear reimbursement scheme.  
 
This paper adds financial constraints to the standard procurement problem.  It considers an 
environment where the regulator is endowed with a limited amount of public funds.   
Consequently, the transfer from the regulator to the firm is bounded.   
 
Financial constraints need to be considered when one studies regulatory problems in 
developing countries.2  Governments in developing countries could not finance all their 
infrastructure projects because they lack the financial resources.  Moreover, local 
governments often have no credible political commitment to long-term financial obligations 
and even if long-term private capital is available, local governments generally can borrow 
only at very high rate of interest, if at all.3  Hence, despite clearly identified benefits, public 
authorities cannot finance all their investment projects because of capital market 
imperfections.  But, even with a limited budget, some infrastructure building could not be 
delayed and will be financed even if funds are scarce. 
 
A cash in advance constraint modifies the procurement contract in a twofold manner.  The 
first and the most obvious consequence is the under-provision of public good by the firm (or 
equivalently a lower quality infrastructure) compared to the asymmetric information case. 
Second, the shape of the procurement contract could be modified by the financial constraint.  
The wealth constraint could change the procurement contract from a two-part tariff, where the 
quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a fixed fee where the firm produces the same 
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quantity whatever its cost.  Hence, a wealth constrained regulator may use a less efficient 
regulatory instrument.4  
 
In different context, Che and Gale (1998), Lewis and Sappington (2000) and Thomas (2002) 
study mechanism design problems with financial constraints.  Like in this paper, the addition 
of financial constraints to the standard informational constraints modifies both the outcome 
and the nature of the optimal mechanism.  For example, Lewis and Sappington (2000) 
consider privatizations to wealth-constrained operators where the most efficient operator is 
not necessarily the one who has the largest resources.  Hence, privatization through an auction 
is not ex-post efficient.  The financial constraint modifies both the shape of the optimal 
mechanism and the amount (or the timing) of trade.  It is optimal to limit the operator's stake 
in the privatized firm to achieve an ex-post efficient privatization. Thomas (2002) considers 
the problem of selling a good to buyers with both unknown willingness to pay (informational 
constraint) and known ability to pay (financial constraint).  In the financially constrained 
selling mechanism, price discrimination is no longer optimal for high valuation buyers.  Like 
in this paper, bunching appears in the financially constrained mechanism.  However in 
Thomas (2002), bunching always occurs while it is not necessarily the case in this paper.    
 
2. The model 
 
The model proposed in this paper is a standard procurement model.  A public authority 
(regulator, principal) contracts with a monopolistic private firm (agent) for the provision of a 
public good.  Production is financed by public transfers.  The firm produces with a constant 
return to scale technology; its cost function is θq, where θ is a constant marginal cost and q 
the quantity produced.5  The marginal cost is private information to the firm. The principal 
only knows that (1) θ ∈Θ ≡ {θ1, θ2} with θ1<θ2 and (2) Prob(θ=θ1)= v1 and Prob(θ=θ2)=v2=1-
v1.  We call Δθ=θ2-θ1. 
 
The procurement contract specifies a quantity transfer pair: <q, T>.  The firm's profit is the 
difference between the transfer T and the production cost: UA= T-θq. The firm accepts the 
contract only if it realizes a non-negative profit (individual rationality (IR) constraint). 
 
When the agent produces a quantity q, the principal collects a surplus S(q). We assume that 
S’≥0, S’(0)=+∞, S’’<0 and S’’’>0. The assumptions on S ensure that it is optimal to have the 
agent producing whatever its cost.  The utility of the principal is the difference between the 
surplus and the transfer: UP=S(q)-T. 
 





3.1 Second best equilibrium 
 
Without the cash-in-advance constraint, the objective of the principal is to maximize its 
expected utility, subject to incentive compatible and participation constraints. The incentive 
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constraints (IC) ensure that the agent of type θi selects the contract <qi, Ti> rather than the 
contract <qj, Tj>, i,j=1,2, i≠j. Without financial constraints, the regulator solves:  
 




q1, q2, T1, T2
 v1(S(q1)-T1) +v2(S(q2)-T2) 
subject to:  
T1-θ1q1 ≥ T2-θ1q2    (IC1) 
T2-θ2q2 ≥ T1-θ2q1    (IC2)  
T1-θ1q1 ≥ 0    (IR1)  
T2-θ2q2 ≥ 0    (IR2)  
The two relevant constraints of this problem are IC1 and IR2. 
 
Proposition 1 (Baron and Myerson, 1982): The solution to the problem [P1] is given by:  





Δθ)   (2) 
T1SB=θ1q1SB+Δθq2SB    (3) 
T2SB=θ2q2SB     (4) 
 
This solution is standard.  The low cost firm θ1 produces the quantity that maximizes the total 
surplus (UA+UP) and makes a positive profit (information rent).  This information rent is 
necessary to fulfill the incentive constraint.  The inefficient firm θ2 makes a zero-profit and 
produces less than the quantity that maximizes the total surplus.  The quantity q2SB is reduced 
compared to the first best in order to lower the profit made by the low cost firm (rent 
extraction-efficiency trade-off). 
 
This second best solution could be implemented with a non linear financing scheme where the 
firm receives a payment T2SB for the production of q2SB and a bonus of ΔT=T1SB- T2SB for the 
additional quantities Δq=q1SB-q2SB.   With this two parts tariff, the firm self-selects and only 
the low cost firm θ1 produces the additional quantities.  
 
3.2 Wealth-constrained equilibria 
 
Consider now the financial constraint. The constraint implies that the principal cannot transfer 
to the agent more than T.  Obviously, the constraint is irrelevant if the highest possible 
transfer T is lower than the highest transfer paid in the second best equilibrium T1SB.  In the 
remaining, we assume: T≤θ1q1SB+Δθq2SB.  When the principal is wealth-constrained, its 
optimization program becomes: 
 




q1, q2, T1, T2
v1(S(q1)-T1) +v2(S(q2)-T2) 
 
subject to: (IC1), (IC2), (IR1), (IR2) and  
T1, T2 ≤ T    (WC)  
 
The solution of this optimization program is given proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2:  




), the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium:  
q1WC=q2WC=T/θ2    (5)  
T1WC=T2WC=T     (6) 
(ii) otherwise, the equilibrium is a separating equilibrium characterized by the following first 










Δθ)   (8) 
T-θ1q1WC-Δθq2WC=0    (9) 
 
And the transfers are given by the constraints (WC) and (IR2).  
T1WC = T     (10) 
T2WC=θ2q2WC    (11) 
(iii) In the separating equilibrium, the value of µ1 is a decreasing and convex function of T, 
with   
€ 
limT→0 µ1 = 0 and   
€ 
limT→T1SB µ1 = v1. 
 
The proof of proposition 2 is relegated to an appendix. Figure 1 illustrates the quantities 
produced when the wealth constraint is relevant. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Consider first the separating equilibrium.  The transfer paid to the agent of type θ1 could be 
decomposed into (i) a compensation for its production cost (θ1q1) and (ii) an informational 
rent (Δθq2) which is necessary to satisfy the incentive constraint.  If this transfer is fixed to T, 
the principal has to reduce both the direct compensation and the informational rent i.e. 
reduces the quantity produced by both types of firm to fulfill the wealth constraint.  On the 
top of the traditional second best trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction that leads to 
distortions in q2, the wealth constraint implies a third best distortion in quantities q1 and q2. 
 















Δθ)  (13) 
In these two expressions, the last terms on the right hand member measure the distortions 
imposed to keep the transfer T1 equals to T.  These distortions depend on the highest possible 
transfer T.  As part (iii) of proposition 2 shows, µ'1 increases when the wealth constraint 
becomes more severe.  The lower T is, the larger are the distortions in quantities. But these 
distortions are unequally distributed among q1 and q2.  The wealth constrained regulator 
selects the most efficient way to reduce the transfer paid.  For that, it compares the efficiency 
cost of reducing the information rent (reducing q2) and the efficiency cost of reducing the 
production cost (reducing q1).  The efficiency cost is measured by the reduction in the 
expected surplus. If v1Δθ is larger (resp. lower) than θ1, a given reduction in q2 reduces more 
(resp. less) the transfer than a similar reduction in q1.  Consequently, q2 will be relatively more 
(resp. less) reduced than q1. 
 
The addition of a third best distortion in q1 and q2 may lead to the collapse of the incentive 
system.  It will be the case if the quantities q1WC and q2WC do not satisfy the necessary 
condition for implementation, namely keeping q1 greater than q2.6  If µ1 is such that q1WC<q2WC, 
the only feasible mechanism is a pooling mechanism where the firm produces the same 
quantity whatever its cost. If θ1>v1θ2, there is a level of µ1' and a corresponding level of T 
(called T*) such that the value of q1 given by (7) is smaller than the value of q2 given by (8). 
Therefore, for T≤T*, the only feasible mechanism is a pooling mechanism.7   
 
Given that the equilibrium is not always separating, the implications in terms of regulatory 
policy are drawn in the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1: The optimal regulation policy for a wealth-constrained principal is a fixed fee T 
for quantity q=T/θ2 when the separating equilibrium does not exist and, otherwise, a two part 
tariff where the firm receives T2= θ2q2WC for the quantity q2WC and a bonus ΔT=T-T2 if the 
firm produces the additional quantities Δq=q1WC-q2WC. 
 
The wealth constraint has two consequences on the regulatory scheme designed by the 
principal. First, there is under provision of the public good compared to the second best 
equilibrium.  Second, in the case where the separating equilibrium does not exist, the 
regulation policy is less efficient. In this case, the principal uses a low-powered regulation 
scheme rather than a (high powered) two-parts tariff. Regulation with fixed fee implies 
additional welfare losses due to the use of a less efficient regulatory instrument. The wealth 
constraint not only reduces the quantities of the good but also the number of instruments 
available to the regulator. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The development of high powered incentive regulatory scheme is a challenge for developing 
countries.  Cook (1999) and Laffont (2002) document that governments often lack the power 
to enforce sophisticated regulatory structures.    This paper argues that a possible explanation 
for not using those kind of financing schemes could come from financial constraints that 
regulators face.    Governments might (optimally) prefer low powered incentive scheme like 
fixed fee, not only because they cannot manage more sophisticated ones but also because it is 
efficient to use those schemes when they are financially constrained.  Using incentive 
mechanisms in procurement contracts is optimal only if the benefits exceed the costs.  This is 
not always true when public funds are scarce. Financially constrained governments may 
                                                
6 If q2<q1, it is impossible to satisfy the two incentive constraints at the same time. This is not 
an issue in the second best problem, because only the action of the inefficient firm θ2 is 
distorted. 
7 In the approach of Thomas (2002), there is bunching whenever T≤ θ2q2SB.  The difference 
comes from the fact that Thomas considers that all types of agent for which the second best 
transfer exceeds the financial constraint receives the same contract while it is not necessarily 
the case in this paper. 
prefer to spend all their money for infrastructure spending rather than using part of it to 
finance incentive procurement contract. 
 
Competition for the procurement contract would be another way to overcome the adverse 
effect of the wealth constraint.  Competition in procurement results in lower information rent 
for the elected firm.8  Hence, governments can finance larger infrastructure with the same 
funds.   However, competition does not guarantee the use of the more efficient regulatory 
instrument9 and the results of this paper continue to hold when several firms compete for the 
procurement contract.10   
 
                                                
8 Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
9 Competition for the procurement contract changes the incentive constraints but the logic 
behind the proof of proposition 2 remains the same. 
10 Cook (1999) and Laffont (2002) show that achieving a sufficient degree of competition in 
procurement is not easy to settle in developing countries. 
 
Appendix: Proof of proposition 2 
 
We use the following result to simplify [P2]: 
 
Lemma 1: When T ≤θ1q1 SB+Δθq2SB, the transfer paid to the low cost firm equals T. 
 
Proof:  If T < T1SB, the solution of [P1] cannot be replicated in [P2]. Then, at least one of the 
transfers in [P2] is given by the constraint (WC).  A necessary condition for implementation 
is: q1≥q2 and T1≥T2.  Then the constraint (WC) binds (at least) for T1. 
 










T=θ1q1+ Δθq2    (µ1) 
T2=q2θ2≤T    (µ2)  
 
Where we indicate the Lagrange multipliers in brackets.  The second constraint is equivalent 
to q2≤q1.  
 














θ2  (15) 
T-θ1q1-Δθq2=0   (16) 
µ2(T-θ2q2)=0    (17) 
 
We know by lemma 1 that µ1>0 if the wealth constraint is relevant.  There are two possible 
solutions to this system of equation: a separating solution when µ2=0 and a pooling solution 
when µ2 is positive. 
 
If µ2> 0, (17) becomes T=θ2q2, then q2=T/θ2. Replacing this value in (16), we have 
q1=q2=T/θ2. 
 










Δθ   (19) 
T-θ1q1-Δθq2=0   (20) 
 
To know which solution applies, we check when µ2 is positive.  As long as q2 is smaller than 
q1, the transfer T2 is smaller than T.  Therefore, the second wealth constraint is slack when 









Δθ    (21) 
where the value of µ1 is given by (20).  Take the limit case where (21) is satisfied with 





As long as the actual µ1 is smaller than this value (call it µ1*), q2 is smaller than q1. 
 
µ1
* is negative if θ1≤v1θ2.  In this case, whatever T, q2 is smaller than q1, except in the limit 
case where T is null where both quantities are equal to zero. 
 
If θ1>v1θ2, we have to find the value of T that generates value of µ1 equals to µ1*. To do this, 






Hence, when T≤T* and θ1> v1θ2, µ2 is positive and the solution is the pooling equilibrium. 
When T≥T*, µ2 is null and the solution is the separating equilibrium. 
 
Now we can show that µ1 increases when T decreases: 








Δθ). Call the right 
hand side G(µ1). Then µ1=G-1(T).  Given our assumptions on S(.), G(.) is increasing and 
concave, because S’-1 is increasing and concave.  Then G-1 is decreasing and convex. (ii) At 
the limit when T goes to T1SB, the problem is identical to [P1] and therefore the solution is 
identical. i.e. µ1=v1.  When T goes to zero, the right hand side of equation (9) must go to zero. 
Given that S’(0)=+∞, we have that G-1 (0)=+∞. 
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  Case 1: θ1≥v1θ2    Case 2: θ1≤v1θ2 
 
Figure 1: quantities produced when the principal is wealth constrained. 
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